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LANCAOt

Law and Development. Edited by Anthony Carty. New York, N.Y.: New
York University Press, 1992, pp. 506.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Law and development as an academic field of study in the United States began in the
1940s, thrived in the middle to late 1960s, and was declared dead by its proponents in the
1
late 1970s. The publication of Law and Development, an anthology of writings compiled
by Professor Anthony Carty, signals a budding resurgence in this field, perhaps the result of
the economic and political transformations that accompanied the demise of the Soviet
Union and occasioned a somber assessment of centralized planning. As transitional
economies in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia adopt measures to loosen the monolithic
hold the state once exerted on the economy, in essence reversing decades of state
domination, the relationship between law and economic development is becoming all the
more urgent. Despite the unique historical legacies that inform the different mixes of
choices and outcomes in each country, a common problem exists: how to restructure the
economy to create economic growth without inflicting lawlessness or, conversely, how to
institute a legal infrastructure that maximizes order and simultaneously promotes economic
growth. This common problem has precipitated a reexamination of the relationship
between law and development.
While the current preoccupation with the institutional arrangements of law and
development is related to the contemporary wave of lawmaking sweeping Eastern Europe
and the developing world, the connection, if any, between law and development has been
examined before. As revealed in the wide selection of articles included in Professor Carty's
anthology, wrestling with the law of emerging legal and economic orders predates the
collapse of the Berlin Wall and, until recently, has been identified not with Eastern Europe
but with the struggles of the developing world. For example, the first part of Law and

t Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A. Mount Holyoke College 1983; J.D. Yale Law
School1987.
1. For a discussion of the "crisis" in law and development, see, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter,
Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States, 1974 \VIS. L. REV. 1062.
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Development includes articles drawn from scholars who subscribe to either of the two
dominant paradigms that have defined the field: modernization theory and dependency
theory, both of which have pre-Berlin roots. The second part of Carty's work explores the
continuing debates in the field about the existence of a "right'' to development, and the
third part examines the international law of development.
Like other books on law and development, Carty's anthology suffers from a truncated
and ahistorical perspective that has plagued the field since its "founders" declared
themselves estranged from their research and scholarship. Although most law and
development inquiries, like Professor Carty's, start by examining the modernization theory
of development that arose in the 1940s and culminated in the 1960s, the field in general and
modernization theory in particular have their origins not in the American law and
development movement of the 1960s, but in the writings of Marx, Engels, and Weber. The
themes identified by those writers are especially relevant for contemporary scholars
interested in the relationship between the development of law and the development of
economics. In Part II of this review, I examine the historical foundations of law and
development that predate both modernization and dependency theories. I also examine
these two defining models of the law and development debate and analyze how they have
been influenced by the theoretical underpinnings developed by Marx, Engels, and Weber
concerning the rule of law and the idea of law as an autonomous versus an instrumental
system of governance. In Part III, I examine the right to development and the international
law of development, the two areas that form the bulk of Professor Carty's anthology. Part
III situates these two phenomena against the background norms and aspirations of the
dependency model. In Part IV, I briefly explore a subject not addressed by any contributor
to the anthology-the emergence of a global economy-and I examine the possibilities it
poses for development.

II.
A.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

Max Weber and Modernization

The law and development movement has often been considered a short-lived
2
movement that suffered a premature death. Presumably, law and development began in
the late 1940s with the construction of a postwar order and the independence of former
colonies-that is, if one views law and development as an American phenomenon. Indeed,
the American law and development movement arose out of the Cold War objectives of the
United States to "modernize" developing countries and bring them within the orbit of the
West rather than the Soviet bloc?
When used in the United States, the term "law and development" is associated with
efforts by American governmental organizations such as the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps or foundations such as the Ford
Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, to encourage and promote the adoption by
developing countries of Western-friendly economic institutions and Western-oriented legal
infrastructures. In the postwar years, American legal scholars began to research and write
about legal institutions or the lack thereof in developing countries. Legal assistance by
American lawyers became part of the U.S. government's foreign aid agenda. Supported by
2. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society
Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1990). The author refers to the era during which law and development
thinking predominated in the United States as the age of"Imperial Law."
3. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN
AMERICA 6, 38 {1980).
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U.S. public and private development assistance funds, an estimated $15 million in
American legal assistance was spent in law and development efforts in Africa, while $5
4
million was spent in both Asia and Latin America. Prescriptions for ailing economies
were founded on the view that law could be used as a mechanism for change and that the
existing legal processes of developing countries could be altered to promote economic
development.5 Modernization theorists contended that "[i]n the law and development
context, 'development' is a euphemism for progress, and the work of law and development
6
is to lead the way to progress through law reform." The movement's prescriptions for
progress were not limited to existing countries but encompassed newly formed independent
countries. For example, Rene David, author of the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1966, noted:
Ethiopia cannot wait 300 or 500 years to construct in an empirical fashion a
system of law which is unique to itself. The development and modernization of
Ethiopia necessitate the adoption of a "ready made" system; they force the
reception of a foreign system of law in such a manner as to assure as quickly as
possible a minimal [sic] security in legal relations?
The law and development movement, however, declared itself dead when it became
apparent that efforts to impose the laws of modem countries on the developing world was
"a flawed and rather inept attempt to offer American legal assistance and implicit American
legal models ... [which] were themselves flawed, vulnerable to executive ordering and
8
authoritarian abuse."
Self-assessments of the reasons for failure focused on the
movement's ethnocentricity and its supposedly naive assumptions that American
institutions could be transposed onto developing countries in order to approximate
American legal liberalism.
Ironically, even in self-criticism, the movement reveals the very limits it bemoans.
First, it assumes that law and development began and ended with the beginning and end of
the American experience of law and development. Second, though its scholars are fully
aware of the origin of their field, they are strangely removed from it, and their scholarship
makes no concerted effort to integrate current theories with the historical background
provided by Marx, Engels, and Weber. Hence, the irony that a critique founded on U.S.
myopia is itself historically myopic.

Law and Development thus begins with current models of development and includes
not a single article by, for example, Max Weber himself. Yet Weber had fully explored the
nexus between law and economic institutions, and indeed, modernization theory can be said
to have its roots in Weber's thesis. Before modernization theorists made the claim that
modem law (clearly articulated legal standards that provide a predictable framework for the
4. See id. at 8.
5. See, e.g., John H. Merryman, Comparative and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival
of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457,461-67 (1977) [hereinafter Merryman]; Elliot
M. Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature & a Critique of 'Scholars in Self-Estrangement, ' 25
AM. J. COMP. L. 492,498-511 (1977) [hereinafter Burg].
6. Merryman, supra note 5, at 463 (citations omitted). Merryman conceived of law and development as
consisting of three types of law reform: "[t]inkering accepts the existing system, seeks to keep it operating, and
makes occasional adjustments to improve efficiency .... 'Following' refers to the sort oflaw reform intended to
adjust the legal system to social change-to the rise of a credit economy, for example. 'Leading' law
reform •.• uses law to change society. Most people, when they think of law reform, refer to some mixture of all
three kinds. This is true of some law and development thinking, but for most people the emphasis has been on
leading law reform." !d. at 462 (citations omitted).
7. Burg, supra note 5, at 506 (quoting Rene David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the
Codification of the Civil Law in African Countries, 37 TuL. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (Remy F. Gross II trans.,
1963)).
8. GARDNER, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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resolution of disputes) is a necessary condition for the progression towards and
development of a modem market, Weber had studied this very connection in Economy and
Society. 9 In fact, before modernization theorists propounded the theory that societies
evolve in sequences towards progressively higher stages of development, culminating in
10
Western-style industrial economies, Weber had arrived at essentially the same conclusion
years before. According to Weber, before the development of modem law, members of
various social, political, ethnic, or religious groups were subjected to a primitive, "special
law" that was of "a strictly personal quality" 11 and that resulted in an overlapping and
eventual collision of jurisdictions. The resolution: either the emergence, as in Rome, of a
12
"'jus gentium,' which coexists together with the 'ius civile' of each group," or the
imposition, as in England, of a "hierocratic ruler [who] will, by virtue of his imperium,
13
impose upon his courts an 'official law' which is to be the only binding one."
With the increasing "bureaucratization of the activities of the organs of the consensual
14
communities" and the development of a market economy, a third alternative developed in
Europe, where there emerged a rational legal system founded on formal, universal rules
which were uniformly applied and which transcended the particularistic bodies of law and
provided the predictability needed to facilitate an exchange economy. The questions for
Weber were twofold: why did a capitalist economy develop in Europe and what were the
conditions that were conducive to its development? According to Weber, the answer lay in
the role of law and the unique characteristics of Western law in particular. Weber saw a
rational legal system as causally related to the development of a capitalist, industrial
economy: European legal systems developed more rationally than the legal systems of other
15
civilizations and preceded the Industrial Revolution in Europe.
Therefore, the key to
economic development for Weber lay in fostering the concomitant development of a
modem, rational legal system composed of the three factors he considered normative
evidence of legal rationality. First, a rational legal system should be autonomous from
other social structures. Second, it should be composed of systematically observable norms
and rules that are purposively constructed. Third, such norms and rules must be applied
with principled consistency to produce a system of predictable, systematic, formal, and
rational law autonomous from prevailing political or religious considerations.
Weber also extended his normative analysis of modem law into a prescriptive
elaboration of the connection between predictable law and the capitalist market. Not only
did modern law integrate disparate communities of private law into a unified system, it was
9. For an English translation of the entire three-volume text, see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1956).
10. See, e.g., W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 4-16
(3d ed. 1990).
11. MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 142 (Max Rheinstein ed. & Max Rheinstein &
Edward Shils trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1954) (1925). The portions of Economy and Society quoted herein nrc
taken from the eighth chapter of Weber's work, entitled "Sociology of Law." The Rheinstein & Shils translation
of this chapter is reproduced in WEBER, supra note 9, at 641.
12. MAXWEBERONLAWINECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 143.
13. Jd.
14. Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
IS. For a counterargument to Weber's assertion that the preconditions for capitalism existed only in
Europe, see Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (Brian Pearce trans., Allen Lane 1974), in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF LAW: A THIRD WORLD READER 70 (Yash Ghai et al. eds., 1987). Rodinson makes the point that
Islamic countries, like European countries, possessed a rational ideology. Id. at 75-77. Why the commercial
order which existed in Muslim countries did not develop into a capitalist sector akin to Europe's cannot be
explained by Weber's claim, according to Rodinson, that "capitalism did not develop in the Islamic world
because the ideology prevailing there was inimical to the rationalism needed for such a development." Jd. at 76.
The answer, Rodinson asserts, may never be known, because it is not possible to prove that Muslim societies
would have engendered capitalism if they had not been colonized or that they were simply inherently incapable
of such development. Id. at 78.
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also the catalyst for and the cause of an economic system founded on principles of
contractual freedom, private property, and competitive markets. Because a rational legal
system produced consistency and predictability, and because capitalist arrangements
required both the restraint of opportunistic behaviors and the promotion of calculable
commercial risks, only a legal order with the elements identified by Weber and described
16
above would be conducive to the development of capitalist exchanges.
Although modernization theory has produced varying sub-theories, it is fair to say that
it is Weberian in its essential assumptions. According to modernization theory, as
epitomized by Rostow's classic treatise, 17 development consists of five historically
identifiable sequences: first, the traditional society, organized around agrarian subsistence
modes of production; second, the preconditions for takeoff, triggered by encounters with
external forces; third, the takeoff, marked by industrial development and increased
economic growth; fourth, the drive towards maturity with a sustained level of economic
productivity and greater linkages with the international economy; and rmally, the age of
18
high mass-consumption, where consumption needs replace basic subsistence needs.
Underlying the ability of the economy to progress from one stage to the next is the
19
ability of members of society to engage in capital accumulation and capital investment.
One of the objectives of modernization theorists then is to institute the conditions necessary
for the creation of surplus capital and the conversion of surplus capital into investment
capital, that is, capital which is used for productive investment purposes. The class with the
ability to "tempt capital into productive channels rather than into the building of
monuments"20 is the capitalist class (as opposed to the traditional classes of moneylenders,
landlords or priests).
Modernization theory assumes that development will be equated with some variant of
Western capitalism, with each stage more or less predetermined along sequences
established by the West. Modem law promotes economic development because a regime of
contract and other laws facilitates economic planning. It promotes political development
because it restrains arbitrary state action and allows the state to derive legitimacy through
rational rules and principles. Thus, the evolution towards progressively higher stages of
economic development should result in the reproduction of political, social, and legal
institutions akin to those that exist in the West, creating not just a free mar,ket economic
21
system but also the foundations of liberal democracy.
Here, Weber's thesis on modem law provides modernization theory with its
formulations on law and development. As universal law replaces the laws of the village
and the tribe, it must consist of rules that are purposefully enacted, rather than rules that,
like their primitive counterparts, emerged with little conscious design. Hence, the idea of
16. A merchant who enters into a contract must know with reasonable certainty that her valid future
expectations would be enforced by the state, based on the framework of substantive rules in which both parties
operate, should the other party renege on the agreement In other words, a modem legal system of autonomous
rules, uniformly and consistently applied to yield a degree of predictability and legitimacy, promotes and furthers
capitalist exchanges, and hence economic growth, because it allows economic players to base their decisionmaking on criteria of formal rationality.
17. See ROSTOW, supra note 10.
18. See id. at4-16.
19. See W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in PARADIGMS IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 59, 68-72 (Rajani Kanth ed., 1994).
20. ld. at 73.
21. See, e.g., DAVID E. APTER, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND
POSTMODERN POLITICS (1987); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Development and Political Decay, in POLITICAL
SYSTEM AND CHANGE 95 (lkuo Kabashima & Lynn T. White III eds., 1986). According to Huntington, there are

at least four elements necessary to political development: rational, universal thought, as identified by Weber;
"nation-building," or the replacement of the particularism of the village or tribe; democratization; and political
participation. See id. at 96-97.
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modem law as law that consists of rules "to achieve social purposes"22 and "to advance in a
rational way toward some knowable goal."23 The objective was to use law as an instrument
to construct a society in which "the state exercises its control over the individual through
law," "rules are consciously designed to achieve social purposes or effectuate basic social
principles" and "enforced equally for all citizens, in a fashion that achieves the purposes for
which they were consciously designed," and in which "the courts have the principal
24
responsibility for defining the effect of legal rules."
History has shown that this prescription did not necessarily transfonn ailing economic
and political institutions in developing countries into the mirror images of their Western
counterparts. Indeed, an instrumentalist concept of law, transposed against a background of
sharp social stratification and an authoritarian state, did not produce a replication of the
Western experience in the developing world. Captured by the forces of authoritarianism,
law did not act as a restraint but became a means by which the executive could further the
seizure and centralization of power. In the absence of a pluralist tradition, law became less,
not more, autonomous. The explanation for this failure lies in the fact that, where the
government is viewed, as it is in many developing countries, as a monolithic entity rather
than as one among many other competing entities in the political process, as in the United
25
States, the role of law is similarly viewed. Law is seen less as a set of institutional rules
used to negotiate the varying conflicting interests in a pluralistic society and more as a
mechanism for the entrenchment and legitimization of state power. Even more unfortunate,
as the state increased its power and non-state, traditional structures such as the village or the
tribe experienced concomitant erosions of power, legal instrumentalism produced the very
antithesis of the result foreseen under the modernization theory of development: an increase
in state dominance and a decrease in legal autonomy.
The modernization movement has been attacked from within and without for the
reasons discussed above-ethnocentricism, myopia, and naYvete?6

22. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1, at 1071.
23. Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 30 (1969). In modem,
dynamic systems, "[t]he role of organized society, of government and law, is to insure that change is channeled
in the right direction. In the modem world, governments do more than maintain order; presumably, they also
solve problems.... Law itself is not scared and timeless, but moves with the times.... It is plainly manipulated
by living people and by organized groups to secure their rights and advance their interests. People believe that
law has a purpose." !d.
24. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1, at 1071-72. For a discussion of the seven commonly shared
assumptions regarding the relationship between law and development, which the authors refer to as the
"paradigm" of"liberal legalism" or "the original paradigm of law and development studies in the United States,"
see id. at I 070-72.
25. See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law
and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 249-57 (1968) (discussing the results of Professor Robert Dahl's
study of the distribution of political power in the context of the city ofNew Haven. See ROBERT A. DAHL, WHo
GoVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961)). The study disproved the conclusions of
theorists who would argue that communities are ruled by single elite classes, insofar as it found that "no single
social or economic group either controlled the decisionmaking process or regularly benefited from the results
reached.•.. [P]ower in New Haven is held by constantly shifting, issue-oriented coalitions." !d. at 250. In the
United States, despite the fact that there may be an elite that benefits from a certain mobilization of resources, the
existence of such a class is unlikely to result in any sort of dictatorship, primarily because the elite is simply part
of a spectrum of political and economic actors and because "[t]he continuing operation of the system, the internal
checks and balances ... limit the changes that can be introduced by any given component part." !d. at 257.
26. Not all adherents of modernization believed that the U.S. legal model could be easily exported. See
Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal Institutions Help Developing
Countries?, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 18-24 (Anthony Carty ed., 1992). Professor Franck notes that very
few countries, even developed countries, rely on lawyers and legal institutions the way Americans do. See ld. at
18. Moreover, given the fact that other priorities, such as poverty, prevail in developing countries, such countries
"are hesitant to create the checks and balances by which lawyers and judges 'weigh in' against dynamic political
action." !d.
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Marx, Engels, and Dependency Theory

In assessing the failures of the modernization theory, proponents of this model have
identified four factors that they consider most responsible for the model's demise:
"empiricallmowledge of the Third World," "loss of faith in liberal legalism as a picture of
United States society," "doubts about the universality or desirability of the American
experience," and "skepticism about policy motives [of govemments]."27 Other reasons
cited include structural deficiencies innate to the developing world-for example, the
absence of a rule-of-law tradition, the requirements of rapid nation-building and the
resultant history of a strong executive, and an inclination towards the political rather than
the judicial or legal process.

Such overall skepticism shares much in common with the skepticism that fueled the
dependency model of development. Both the modernization and dependency theories view
the exportation to developing countries of liberalism and the market as problematic,
although dependency theorists believe that capitalism itself and the links imposed on the
developing world by the international capitalist economy constitute the major cause of
underdevelopment in the Third World. As modernization theory came under attack,
dependency theory gained prominence in the mid-1970s. David Greenberg's article, Law
and Development in Light of Dependency Theory, which Professor Carty has included in
his anthology, provides an excellent articulation of the dependency model.
Historically, however, it was not the founders of the dependency model who first
described underdevelopment as a process caused by the exploitation of the capitalist
system. The fact that Professor Carty fails to include writings by Marx and Engels again
reveals a certain ahistorical view-a view that continues to dominate the field of law and
development. The charge that trade and conquest are linked in a manner detrimental to
developing nations but beneficial to Europe28 was first articulated by Karl Marx in the
nineteenth century. According to Marx,
[t]he discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and
entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the
conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for
the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of
capitalist production.... The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised
looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother-country and were
there turned into capital.29
Unlike modernization theory, which views development as relatively apoliticized,
dependency theory views development as intensely political and rife with power dynamics.
Even with regard to the basic issue of capital accumulation, the two theories differ
markedly in their assessments of the conditions necessary for the accumulation of capital.
Modernization theory sees the creation of surplus capital as central to economic
development and implicitly assumes that just as Europe was able to engage in capital
accumulation, so too would developing countries, provided the right policies were adopted.
27. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1, at 1090-93.
28. For example, trading between Europe and non-Western civilizations (such as China, India, Indonesia)
was difficult because Europe had little that was desirable to these countries. As Europe possessed greater

military strength, plunder and conquest became the mechanism through which to enforce trade on unfavorable
terms. See David F. Greenberg, Law and Development in Light of Dependency Theory, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 89, 100.
29. 1 KARL MARx, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLmCAL ECONOMY 823-26 (Frederick Engels ed. & Samuel
Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Modem Library 1936) (1883).
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Marx and the Marxist-influenced dependency theory, on the other hand, view capital
accumulation as a historically specific occurrence that is inextricably tied, in the case of
Europe, with the plunder of developing countries' economies.
For dependency theorists, colonial laws are instrumental in institutionalizing not just
the inequalities of "trade" but also the forcible and violent transformations of traditional
societies. Just as Weber provided insights for modernization theorists, Marx provided
dependency theorists with an analytical foundation: law as a reflection of the material
30
forces of production. Although Engels refined Marxist theory to take into account the
31
fact that determinants other than economics influence the course of society, both Marx
and Engels believed that law derives from, and is essentially secondary to, economics.
As noted by dependency theorists, colonial economies were inextricably linked with
colonial laws. Through law, colonizing powers made massive confiscation of land legal.32
Native industries were prohibited in order to prevent competition with goods made by the
colonizing countries. As these goods inundated native economies, they visited disastrous
3
consequences upon local industries?
In sum, the connection between law and
underdevelopment was one in which European "legal systems structured economic
relations between colonizer and colonized to the advantage of the former and the detriment
of the latter."34
The law and development movement then has produced two very distinct theories,
each with antithetical views about the causes of underdevelopment, the solutions for
underdevelopment, and the role of law in furthering economic development. As to the last
point, the debate concerns the distinction between autonomous and instrumental law. On
the one hand, the dependency model assumes that law is not independent of the social,
political, and religious spheres of society. On the other hand, modernization theory
associates modem law with predictability, rationality, and purposiveness. It conceives of
35
law as a body of legal rules shaped by rational and conscious design and "valued for their
36
instrumental utility in producing consciously chosen ends." Western liberalism in fact
holds that law is autonomous and impartial to the vicissitudes of the nonlaw spheres.
Indeed, one of the objectives of law is to act as a restraint on the state; law cannot be
subject to the control of the state if it is to perform this function and is to be seen as a
legitimate source of autonomous authority. Modem law is to be both autonomous from
social interests and instrumental for the purposes of establishing certain social interests-as
long as it is not susceptible to capture by authoritarian interests.
Interestingly, the notion of law as instrument presented little discomfort for
dependency theory. Inspired by Marxist theory, the dependency model maintains that the
30. See Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, reprinted in KARL
MARx & FREDERICK ENGELS, SELECTED WORKS IN ONE VOLUME 181 (International Publishers 1969).
31. See letter from Frederick Engels to J. Bloch (Sept. 21-22, 1890), reprinted in SELECTED WORKS IN
ONE VOLUME, supra note 30, at 692. Although Engels, in his study of ancient Athens, traced the origin of the
state to the increased entrenchment of class differences and identified the state's interest with that of the ruling
classes, he also acknowledged that the state is not monolithic, nor is it necessarily always an instrument for class
domination. See generally FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE
(Alec West trans., International Publishers 1972) (1942). Contrast the analyses of Marx and Engels with that of
Weber, who asserted that in the development of law, economic conditions are not per se decisive; rather, it is
only the particular arrangement of capitalist enterprises which require predictable risk calculations that is
decisive in the evolution towards modern, predictable law. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
32. For example, in Southern Rhodesia, Europeans, who made up 10% of the population, took 49 million
acres ofland and left approximately 28 million acres for native Africans. See Greenberg, s11pra note 28, at I 02.
33. See id. at 103.
34. Jd.
35. See Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH 153,
154-56 (Myron Weiner ed., 1966).
36. Id. at 155.
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neutral front offered by liberal law in fact masks the intensely political power expressions
that produce systemic inequalities. Indeed, the law enacted by socialist states makes no
claims towards autonomy and purports merely to be a reflection of and an instrument for
the construction of a socialist society. For example, even in the 1982 Constitution of the
People's Republic of China, designed to highlight the importance of law, Article 5 states
unequivocally that "[t]he state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal
system."37
The debate over the autonomy of law is indeed a well-worn one. And yet, it is
important to realize that, to the extent that law has been captured by authoritarian interests
in certain developing countries, it would be difficult to assert that the institution of the rule
of law was the proximate cause of the establishment of authoritarianism or even that
authoritarianism would not have been established but for the introduction of the rule of law.
Indeed, in all likelihood, authoritarianism would have been imposed whether or not legal
rules had been introduced by the law and development movement. My point is that while
history should give pause to anyone who might make the grand claim that the rule of law
causes economic or political development, and while it is too simplistic to believe that the
simple insertion of the rule of law into traditional societies will create the necessary
elements of democratic and liberal institutions, one also cannot deny that the rule of law
supports the construction of political democracy.
Without addressing the more
controversial complexities of whether the rule of law and liberal democracy are inconsistent
with non-Western, traditional values, certainly one can make the following minimal claim
without triggering accusations of cultural insensitivity: where legal rules are applied with
principled consistency to both the state and its citizens, they generally restrain rather than
expand the arbitrary exercise of state power.
Rather than wallowing in self-criticism, law and development scholars should work to
institute a legal regime that promotes the principled application of law in the developing
world. As an article by James Paul and Clarence Dias illustrates: "[d]ifferent kinds of law
can be used to organize administration and direct it toward prescribed objects, to create
38
different kinds of institutions and to allocate powers and roles to actors within them."
The article examines the establishment of a rural development program and shows that
while "[l]aw is still used to monopolize state control over ... resources and activities which
39
make development possible for the rural poor," "law may be differently used in order to
promote self-reliant participation and more equitable allocation ofresources."40
Law and development programs can be designed to achieve ends that take into
consideration the particular conditions of the developing countries themselves. Bruce
Zagaris' article on the various models of legal assistance and the U.S. transfer of legal
education and legal institutions to the Caribbean provides an interesting analysis of both the
intellectual origins of the field and the actual law reform projects that Congress has funded
to "enable the rule of law to build a cornerstone of democracy and be a positive force for
41
just economic and social development."
These development programs support the
formation of quality legal training, the recruitment of judges on a nonpartisan basis, the
training of prosecutors and public defenders, the formation of professional associations
37. XIANFA (1982) [Constitution] art. 5 (People's Republic of China), reprinted in 1 THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1979-1982) 1, 5 (Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress ed. & trans., 1987).
38. James C.N. Paul & Clarence J. Dias, State-Managed Development: A Legal Critique, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 279, 279.
39. Paul & Dias, supra note 38, at 280.
40. !d. at 279.
41. Bruce Zagaris, Law and Development or Comparative Law and Social Change-The Application of Old
Concepts in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 121, 135 (citation
omitted).

554

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:545

such as bar groups, the use of public information campaigns to educate the public about the
basic human rights, and the promotion of the concepts of equal protection and equal
justice.42 While, as the article points out, a danger of being associated or identified with the
foreign policy aims of the U.S. government may exist, there are also worthwhile objectives
that can be furthered by these programs, which represent constructive, positive applications
of law. Despite the self-doubts of the modernization theorists, a ten-year period during
which law and development failed to transform authoritarian governments into democratic
ones should not lead to the conclusion that law and development is essentially a doomed
endeavor.

III. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
DEVELOPMENT
In the 1970s, a movement emerged to declare a "right" to development and create an
international law of development. This movement is amply documented in Professor
Carty's anthology. The international law of development deals with corrective measures
designed to alter structural deficiencies considered damaging to the economic development
of developing nations. The right to development movement is related to the international
law of development in the sense that the former attempts to enshrine the latter's efforts in
the formal language of rights. The newly claimed right to development is considered part
of an array of rights that follows the establishment of the first generation of human rights
(political and civil rights) and the second generation of human rights (social, economic, and
cultural rights). As former colonies gained independence and became members of the
United Nations (UN), they began to push, through the auspices of the UN General
Assembly, for the declaration of new rights, such as the right to a new international
economic order43 or the right to development. Because developing countries constitute the
majority in the General Assembly (which functions under a one-country, one-vote rule), a
concerted effort was made to utilize the General Assembly as a forum for lawmaking. As
Professor Philip Alston notes in his article defending the right to development: '"in
practice, a claim is an international human right if the United Nations General Assembly
says it is. "'44
The objective of this emerging movement is to link human rights with development
and thus create a human right to development. As Professor Jack Donnelly, an opponent of
the right to development, remarked in an article also included in Law and Development, in
1977 the UN Commission on Human Rights first put forth "'[t]he international dimensions
of the right to development as a human right in relation with other human rights based on
international cooperation, including the right to peace, taking into account the requirements
of the New International Economic Order and the fundamental human needs."' 45 Since that
time, the General Assembly has issued resolution upon resolution concerning a right to
development, presumably in order to call upon developed nations to agree to some sort of
42. Zagaris, supra note 41, at 135-38.
43. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6th
Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1 at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9959 (1974).
44. Philip Alston, Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 207, 207 (quoting Richard Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights:
Some Basic Questions, 1969 WIS. L. REv. 171, 173).
45. Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development,
in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 169, 170-71 (quoting Question of the Realization of the
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Study of Special Problems Relating to
Human Rights in Developing Countries, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 4, U.N. ESCOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 75,
U.N. Doc. F15927 (1978)).

1997]

LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A NEW BEGINNING

555

46

redistribution of economic resources on a global scale. As described by proponents of the
right to development, such a right exists, but "as with all human rights the bases are not
47
restricted to legal principles, but include broader moral and ethical concerns." The right
is thus founded on a mix of precepts, including, for example, moral duty, restitution for past
colonial wrongs, notions of international cooperation, and a cause-and-effect argument that
"underdevelopment is not just a matter of backwardness or retardation [but] [r]ather, it is
48
the by-product of the development of Western countries."
For the most part, the right to development movement and the international law of
development are linked to and inspired by the analysis of international economic relations
offered by the dependency model of law and development. Both schools subscribe to some
variant of the dependency model's structural view of the international economy. According
to dependency theorists, because underdevelopment is caused by structural barriers that
have survived colonization and continue to dominate the relationship between the
developed and the developing worlds, the integration of developing nations into the global
economy will only perpetuate dependency. Raoul Prebisch, one of the main proponents of
the structuralist school of thought, argues that developing countries serve the needs of
developed countries to the detriment of the former by exporting agricultural or primary
commodities in exchange for manufactured goods from Europe. Because demand for
agricultural commodities fluctuates in wild swings, developing countries dependent on
export for their foreign exchange earnings will suffer economic fluctuations whenever
49
As a result of
agricultural commodity prices fluctuate in the international market.
Prebisch's analysis, developing countries, especially those in Latin America, began to
pursue import substitution rather than export promotion. Instead of the production for
export of goods that comport with their comparative advantages, import substitution meant
looking inward, building local industries, and producing as substitutes for local
consumption products that were formerly imported.
Import substitution necessarily entailed protectionist measures to insulate local
industry and economic nationalism to control foreign investment,50 as well as heavy state
involvement in the economy and state mobilization of capital resources (primarily in the
form of debt) to fmance a new economic infrastructure. Law and Development includes an
excellent analysis of how developing countries that chose the dependency-inspired import
51
substitution model engaged in a process aptly termed "[r]enegotiating the [b]argain." Part
of this process involves the establishment of a right to a restructured international economy
on historically different terms. As discussed in Professor Kofele-Kale's article, in
46. See Donnelly, supra note 45, at 199-200 ("one standard interpretation presents the right to development

as primarily or exclusively an economic right, a right 'parallel, on the economic level, to self-determination on
the political plane.' It is regularly referred to as 'the right to economic and social development;' ... 'the right to
an adequate standard of living;' or simply 'economic and social rights, or the right to development."') (citations
omitted).
47. Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 26, at 223, 225.
48. Rich, supra note 47, at 228 (citation omitted).
49. Prebisch published this and other arguments in a 1949 study entitled "The Economic Development of
Latin America and Its Principal Problems," which he prepared for the Economic Commission for Latin America
See DIANA HUNT, ECONOMIC THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETING PARADIGMS 130
(1989). For a critique of Prebisch's theory, see David Osterfeld, The Liberating Potential of Multinational
Corporations, in PERPE1UATING POVERTY: THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 271,
284-92 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds., 1994).
50. Control of foreign investment included imposing mandatory joint ventures on foreign investment rather
than allowing wholly-owned, foreign-invested enterprises; favoring local capital and local investors over foreign
capital and foreign investors; excluding foreign investment from certain sectors of the economy; and restricting
the repatriation of profits by foreign investors.
51. See Joseph J. Jova eta!., Private Investment in Latin America: Renegotiating the Bargain, in LAw AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 333.
.
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accordance with the aims of proponents of the international law of development,
developing countries began to push for structural accommodations for certain developingcountry preferences within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATf). 52 A new
Part IV, entitled "Trade and Development," was added to the GATT in 1965 to address the
development needs of developing nations. The GATT also adopted a Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) to give developed countries discretionary authority to grant duty-free
or preferential treatment to products from developing countries without demanding
reciprocity of those developing countries.
Ironically, even though dependency theorists like Marx and Engels downplayed the
importance of law, the dependency model has succeeded in spawning an international law
of development, which includes a range of issues represented in the collection of articles
included in Parts II and III of Professor Carty's anthology. Besides preferential treatment
or GSP concessions granted within the framework of the GATT, the international law of
development also includes issues such as debt forgiveness or debt relief, below-market rates
for new loans, preferential terms in the transfer of technology, and commodity agreements
for the establishment of a common fund covering certain primary commodity exports to
minimize commodity price fluctuations that could decimate export earnings.53
The proliferation of General Assembly resolutions purporting to declare the rights of
developing nations and the correlative duties of developed nations is remarkable because it
has successfully created a new area of international law spearheaded by the very model of
development that deems law to be a mere reflection of economics. As a result, while
scholars engaged in the international law of development work to alter GATT rules, for
example, the legal framework is considered merely an instrument for the correction of
structural inequities. Thus it is no surprise that Professor Kofele-Kale, a proponent of a
new legal trading regime, states that "[t]hese policies reject the orthodox GATT view of
international trade as an end in itself rather than as an instrument of economic and social
54
development."
The international law of development has been successful in bringing to the forefront
the persistent economic problems faced by developing nations. However, its counterpart,
the movement to declare a right to development, will not be recognized any time soon.
Professor Donnelly's article delineating all the conceptual and practical reasons for this
provides a good starting point for anyone interested in the debate. On practical grounds
alone, there is simply no consensus among states that such a right exists. International law
is in part still based on the notion of state consent. Although international human rights is
indeed founded on a post-Nuremberg scheme that calls into question the notions of state
sovereignty and state consent, the rights that are generally acknowledged to be sufficiently
"universal" to reverse the usual deference paid to state sovereignty are those solidly within
the parameters of the first generation of human rights, not those from the second, third, or
fourth generations.
There are legitimate criticisms of the bifurcation of rights into first and second
generations, and indeed, of the characterization of political and civil rights as "negative"
rights and of economic, social, and cultural rights as "positive" rights.55 Nonetheless,
despite considerable efforts, economic rights have not been accepted as human rights by the
52. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in the Law of GATT: Toward
Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading System, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, nt
363.
53. For a discussion of the Integrated Program for Commodities QPC), see ROBERTS. WALTERS & DAVID
H. BLAKE, 1HE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 49-52 (4th ed. 1992).
54. Kofele-Kale, supra note 52, at 405.
55. See generally G.J.H. van Hoof, The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal
ofSome Traditional Views, in 1HE RIGHT TO FOOD 97 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tom~evski eds., 1994).
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rich, capital-exporting states-the very actors whose cooperation constitutes a prerequisite
56
for any interstate transfer of economic benefits. The so-called third generation right to
development had likewise met with rejection. The right to development has generally been
characterized as a collective right, that is, a right "emphasizing the struggles of peoples,
nations, and States for the elimination of obstacles which impede development'' or "a
57
collective right of sovereign States or of peoples fighting for their independence." As
such, it may be even more difficult to persuade states to accept this right. It not only
embodies all the conceptual difficulties characteristic of economic rights (because it
embodies at least the economic development objectives laid out in the New International
Economic Order), but also presents an additional conceptual hurdle because of its collective
rather than individual base. Its collective quality goes against the origin and grain of
Western concepts of human rights as rights from and against the state. While it may even
be said that human rights can be expanded beyond "rights from" to include "rights to" (that
is, rights to food or shelter, which the state has an obligation to provide), it is another thing
to say that the state itself possesses the right to development. If this were the case, an
authoritarian state such as China or Myanmar would qualify as a rights holder and could
proclaim rights for itself and assert that capital-exporting states have an affirmative and
correlative obligation to redistribute economic benefits that may or may not reach their
citizenries.
To the e~ent that the right to development has influenced the international law of
development and brought to the forefront the historical and structural impediments to
economic development, it has had a positive effect. As discussed above, issues such as
debt relief, the volatility of primary commodities, technology transfers, nonreciprocal tariff
preferences, and codes of conduct for transnational corporations have become routine legal
matters within the field, thanks largely to the efforts of the international law of
development and the right to development movement.

IV. REASSESSMENT: GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Both modernization and dependency theorists have been proven incorrect in their
analyses of the causes of and solutions to underdevelopment. The modernization model
oversimplifies the process of development by viewing it as a series of progressions
culminating in an essentially Western-style economy with a Western-style liberal
democracy. Modem law consisting of universally applicable rules is supposed to allow law
to be both autonomous from the social and the political and at the same time instrumental
and purposive, that is, enacted with a purpose in mind, rather than arising unconsciously
through the mere force of tradition. Experience has shown that a legal system of
predictable rules and regulations, interpreted with reasoned elaboration by neutral arbiters
not susceptible to the whims of extralegal forces, does in fact promote the stable
58
environment needed for long-term investment. At the same time, however, experience
56. Other reasons exist for why economic rights present conceptual difficulties. The term "human rights"
as used in the United Nations Charter emerged from the post-World War II context and referred to rights that had
been abused by the state. These rights have been "identified with the liberal state, the freedoms and immunities
now known as 'civil and political rights."' LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 190
(1995). Economic rights have also been problematic for the developed world in particular, which feared not just
redistribution of wealth within a state itself but also redistribution from rich to poor states. See id. at 190-92.
57. Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development,
in LAWANDDEVELOPMENT,supranote26, at 169, 191.
58. In order to transform the economy into what is called a '"socialist' market" economy, China engaged in
a frenzy of lawmaking to establish a predictable framework satisfactory to market actors. Under the 1989 Five
Year Plan, the government proposed to draft 22 priority laws, including, for example, a Banking Law, a
Domestic Investment Law, a Securities Law, a Fair Competition Law, a Foreign Trade Law, International
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has also shown that the rule of law, though necessary for promoting economic
development, does not necessarily cause political liberalization. By the same token, neither
59
does it cause or contribute to authoritarianism in the Third World.
Once-authoritarian
states like Taiwan, South Korea, Chile, and Argentina illustrate the possibility that political
liberalization may indeed follow upon the heels (though not always immediately) of
economic development.
Inspired by Marx's determination that law functions as a superstructure imposed upon
a more primary economic base, dependency theorists do not claim that law is independent
of society. On the contrary, because law is already a reflection of the ruling interests, they
see no inconsistency in utilizing law for the instrumentalist objective of furthering the
interests of the nonruling class. Instead of viewing development in ahistorical terms, the
dependency model views dependency and underdevelopment in stark historical terms,
without any claims that the process of development is neutral or sequential. At the same
time, however, the model overestimates the barriers that prevent or retard development.
Indeed, the record shows that developing countries that have adopted an export-promotion
strategy (that is, a strategy emphasizing linkages with the international economy and
integration with the liberal trading norms of the GATI) have had a more enviable record of
economic growth than developing countries that have adopted the import-substitution,
delinking policies advocated by the dependency model.
Until now, one of the main preoccupations of development has been the relationship
between the state and the national economy. Yet, with the increasing globalization of the
economy and of economic actors, one must wonder whether development can continue to
be seen primarily as a state-centered endeavor. A number of transformations have occurred
6
which have significant implications for development. ° For example, it is no longer
possible to determine accurately the nationality of corporate actors (beyond the technical
formality of an entity's state of incorporation or even the place of the corporate seat), not
just because of the tendency towards cross-ownership among corporations but also because
corporations are no longer bound to the traditional restrictions of territoriality. All the
major factors of production-capital, technology, production, information-routinely flow
across national boundaries. States no longer possess the ability to enforce or impose
restrictions on the inflow or outflow of these factors of production. Similarly, and perhaps
in response to the increasingly nonterritorial needs of business, corporations are shifting
from a top-down command structure of parents and headquarters on the one hand and
subsidiaries and branches on the other, to a system of global webs of overlapping centers
with operations worldwide. Products are no longer made in one or two countries but in a
number of countries. The production process, including the design, fmancing, assembly,
manufacturing, and distribution of a product, is no longer confmed to the territorial borders
of any one state. As intellectual property displaces real property as the currency of choice,
Arbitration Regulations, and Regulations Relating to Foreign Mining Investment. See Ann Seidman & Robert B.
Seidman, Drafting Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM.]. COMP. L. 1, 3-4 &
n.16 (1996).
59. Scholarship from both sides of the debate generally acknowledges that Jaw can indeed be utilized for
either authoritarian or participatory ends. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 26, at 24-25 ("Jaw, as such, is neither
good nor bad, either for development or for anything else. . . . [L]aw is neutral about development and about
kinds or directions of development."); Yash Ghai, Constitutions and Governance in Africa: A Prolegomenon, In
LAW AND CRISIS IN THE 1HIRD WORLD 51, 60 (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala cds., 1993) ("because
communist constitutions are intended to facilitate the transformation of society in pursuit of the teleological view
of human destiny governed by historical materialism, their instrumentalism is overt.").
60. For a discussion of these transformations and the implications posed, see, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH, THE
WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21-ST CENTURY CAPITALISM (1992); GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GoVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
The analysis that follows can also be found in Lan Cao, Towards a New Sensibility in International Economic
Development, 32 TEx. INT'LL.J. 209 (1997).
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the global economy itself is also shifting from the traditional high-volume manufacturing of
standardized products to a high-value production of specially tailored services and
commodities, which facilitates a concomitant shift in the traditional modes of
manufacturing. Production of intellectual property does not require a traditional
territorially based corporation but rather only an aggregate of decentralized and dispersed
webs, each engaged in the design and production of high-value activities. Production shifts
have also meant that it is no longer accurate to view developing countries primarily as
manufacturers of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods. In other words, the
rules have changed and the world itself has changed.
Like other grand-scale transformations, the globalization of capital and production
and the existence of a global economy have created uncertainties and unease, both in
developed and developing countries. Paradoxically, while the colonial legacy meant a fear
of international trade by poor countries, with increasing frequency we now hear anxieties
about the global economy from the developed rather than the developing world. With the
increasing frequency and ease with which the factors of production move across national
boundaries, the interdependence of the world's markets surely calls for a different
conceptual understanding of the relationship between the world's poor and rich countries.
The questions to be addressed should include the implications created by the changes
described above. For example, what is meant by comparative advantage, given the primacy
of intellectual as opposed to real property in today's high-technology, information-oriented
society? Given the mobility of international capital and the internationalization of
production, how much of a threat is the so-called low-wage comparative advantage of the
poor world? Does the growth of emerging economies present a threat or a potential
stimulus to the developed economies? What should be the role of government in both
developed and developing countries, given the adjustments that would be required, for
example, as low-wage, low-skilled manufacturing jobs move into the Third World? As
national economies and national corporations become more international, what economic
policies should both developing and developed countries pursue? With the increasing
irrelevance of corporate nationality, does it make sense to protect national interests by
protecting the national corporation or the national economy from "too much" international
competition? Against this new background, what legal regime will best promote economic
growth. Last and most importantly, of course, what is the relationship between law and
development? These are some of the critical issues that future works on law and
development must attempt to explore and address.
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